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INTERTEMPORAL LABOR SUPPLY: AN ASSESSMENT
ABSTRACT
The lifecycle labor supply model has been proposed as an
explanation for various dimensions of labor supply, including
movements over the business cycle, changes with age, and within—
person variation over time.According to the model, all of these
elements are tied together by a combination of intertemporal
substitution effects and wealth effects.This paper offers an
assessment of the model's ability to explain the main components




Princeton, NJ 08544Intertemporal Labor Supply: An Assessuent
The systematic study of intertemporal labor supply began only two
decades ago.
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In a remarkably short time the lifecycle model of individual
hours choice has moved to the forefront of both micra— and macro-
econometricresearch.This paper begins witha look at the original
questionsthatfirst lead to interest in the lifecycle approach. I then
presenta selective review of the evidence on various dimensions of
intertemporallaborsupply.I limit my discussion to microeconomecric
studies of male labor supply. making no attempt at an exhaustive survey of
even this branch of the literature.
2
Rather, my goal is tQ offer an
assessment of the success and/or failure of the lifecycle model in
providing a useful framework for understanding the major components of
individuallaborsupply
I conclude that the lifecycle labor supply literature sheds very little
light on the questions that first generated interest in a lifecycle
approach: what determines the shape of the lifecycle hours profile? how
does labor supply respond to aggregate wage changes? what is the source of
idiosyncratic changes in year—to—year labor supply? Part of the reason for
th[s stemsfrom a tendency intheliterature to concentrate on one aspect
ofintertemporal hours variation ——theresponse to wage growth along a
known lifecycle trajectory and to ignore another, namely, the response
to wage innovations that lead to revised expectations about future wage
Lucas andRapping (1970) seem tobethe firstauthorstousean
explicit intertemporal model to describe short and long run labor supply
phenomena.although Mincer (1962) dlscinguished becween the effects of
short run unemployment and long run wage increases in explaining the
behavior of female labor supply.
2Excellent surveys are available in Killingsworth (1983) and Pencavel
(1986).rates. More seriously perhaps. much of the effort devoted to studying
lifecycle 1.abor supply has takenthe positionthataverage hourly earnings
during the year is a "sufficient statistic" for hours choices within the
year.There is considerable evidence against this narrow reading of the
lifecyclemodel.
L The Ouestlons
A series of substantive questions motivated the original interest in
lifecycle labor supply.Lucas and Rapping (1970). following an original
suggestion of Friedman (1976, pp.206-207),positeda lifecycle framework as
a way to reconcile an elastic short—run labor supply curve with an
inelastic or even backward—bending long—run labor supply curve.Lucas and
Rapping's idea was to model cyclical hours variation as a response to a
temporary wage change.Subsequently, much debate in the macroeconomics
literature has focused on the size of this Intertemporal wage elasticity.
A second motivation for studying lifecycle labor supply arose from
interest in human capital theory, and the recognition that the pattern of
lifecycle hours is influenced by the pattern of lifecycle wage rates. This
goalis clearly articulated by Heclcman (1976, page S12), who notes that a
model with endogenous labor supply can potentially reconcile differences in
the lifecycle profiles of earnings andhourlywage rates.
A related question is whether wagegrowth over the lifecycle can
explain the parallel profiles of consumption and earnings.The simplest
permanent income model predictsno systematic relation between earnings and
3LucasandRapping (1970. footnote 11) also noted in passing that
theirmodel had '...lifecyeleaswell as business—cycle implications."3
consumption.The finding that individuals with steeper lifecycle profiles
of earnings have steeper lifecycle profiles of consumption has therefore
bee" used as evidence of credit constraints or other impediments to an
optimal lifecycle allocation (Thurow (1969), Chez in Cbez end Becker
(1975). Carrol and Summers (1989)). AsflCkjjafl (1974) pointed out,
however, a model with endogenous labor supply can explain the parallel age
profiles of consumption and earnings, if leisure and consumption are
4
complements.
Other questions have also emerged: what (if anything) can we conclude
about the interpretation of measured unemployment (Ashenfelter and Ham
(1979))? how does a lifecycle perspective affect the interpretation of the
responses measured in the Negative Income Tax experiments? how doer a"
inteigeneiational transfer system (such as Social Security) affect the
hours of young and old workers? Finally, and perhaps fundamentally, how
can we explain the enormous year—co—year variation in individual—specific
labor supply that appears in virtually every available panel data set?
The power of the lifecycle framework. and the extent of economists'
faith in the model, are illustrated by considering asimpledecomposition
of individual labor supply into aggregate time effects, systematic age
effects, permanent person—specific effects, andperson—and—yearspecific
effects. The lifecycle labor supply model has bee" proposed as a"
explanation for all four components!Lucas and Rapping(1970)proposed
that a lifecycle model could explain aggregate year—to—year m oveulents in
labor supply (the "time effects" in acomponents—of—variance model)
4This same idea can potentially explain the "excess" covariation of
income and consumption growth in aggregate data.4
Heckman(1974, 1976),Chez andBecker(1975),andothers proposed that the
lifecycle model could explain sys tematic age effects in hours of work, and
also differences across people in their amount of market woik over the
lifecycle (i.e.theperson—specific constants),Finally, models used by
liaCurdy(1981),Altonji (1986) andotherslinkperson—and—year—specific
changes in hours to the corresponding changes inwages.
ILThe Basic tiodel
Aprototypical lifecycle labor supply model begins with atime—
reparableutility function defined over consumption (cj)andhoulB of work
(hj) of individual 1.ineach of a sequence of periods t—O, 1, 2,...
(1) P
Here,fl—(l+p)measures subjective time discounting and is a sequence
of"taste shifters" that capture heterogeneity across individuals andover
time.jç models with uncertainty, preferences are assumed to be additive
overstates and time (with the same U( )function)sothat the consumer's
objective function is simply the expectation of (1). conditional o" current
information.
The second element of the model is the intertemporal budget constraint.
which describes the change in the value of assets (Aj) between periods:
(2) Aj+i/p+i —(1+r) (A/p + -ce).
Here,Pt is
thepuce of consumption goods in t, is the real interest
rate in period t (assumed to be known). and is the real wage of
individual Iforhourswouked in period t.5
Aninterior solution for maximization of the expectation of (1),
subject to (2) and a" appropriate terminal condition on assets. is
characterized by first—order conditions for consumption and hours ftperiod
t, together witha"Lntetteioporal optimality condition for the marginal







Equations(3a)and(3b) canbesolved for consumption and hours in terms of
andthecurrent marginal utility of wealth.It is conventional to
refertothe impliedsolutionfor hours as the "intercemporal laborsupply
function",Witha" appropriate transformationofthe taste shift variable
writethe log—linear approximation6 of this function as:
(4) log
— +i7log w + 6 log A1.
The parameter 'i represents the elasticity of hours in period C with respect
to wages j t, holding constant the marginal utility of wealth. Following
the literature. I shall refer to 'ias the intertemporal substitution
elasticity. This elasticity is necessarily positive, and is strictly
greeter than the (lUcks Ian) compensated labor supply elasticity associated
with the same preferences. if leisure is a normal good. The parameter 6
represents the elasticity of hours with respect to the marginal utility of
See Macurdy (1985) for example
6C1 course one could start with a specification of U thatimp1L&the
log—linear intertemporal labor supply function (4). Issuesof funccional
formarediscussed in Browning, Deatort, and Irish (1965).wealth, and also must be positive if leisure is a normal good. The two
elasticities are related by the simple condition
c1 3log c1 17-6 —s
w1b.1 flw1 Ifconsumption is Enependento wages,holding constant themarginal
utility of wealth (asis implicitly assumed in the permanent income
consumption model), then J—6.
Notethe convenient form of the lifecycle labor supply function (4)
Asa consequence of the additive structure of preferences, the effects of
assetincome and future wages arecompletely summarized inthevalue of
With perfect foresight and constant real interest rates, (3a) implies
t that — gwhere g is greater or less than 1 depending on the gap
between the real interestrateand the rate of time preference p.In this
case, apart from taste changes and a geometric trend. the lifecycle profile
of labor supply is completely determined by the profile of wages.
The implications of cthe lifecycle model under uncertainty are most
easily seen by combining equation (3c) with equation (4) to describe the
change in hours between periods t—l and t:
(5)flog hit —Aa1 +Alogw1&.(r1p) + S +6
where• log log Ajisthe one—period—ahead forecast error
in the logarithm of the marginal utility of wealth. and
— exp(*1) )j
Theletter term is a constant ifthe(prior)
distribution of is constant.Thus, the change in labor supply consists
of acomponentdue to changes in tastes acomponent dueto
Ihave simplified(5)slightly using the approximations log(ltp)—p
andlog (l+r)_r.variation in wages, a component due to the difference between the real
interest rate and the rate of time preference, and a component due to any
updating in the logarithm of the marginal utility of income.
Thesimple form of equation (5)hasconsiderableappeal. andvariants
of if are used in many recent microeconometñc studies of labor supply. In
astochastic environment, however, it is important cokeepinmind that the
responseof individual hours to a change in wages has two parts. The first
of these is as in the perfect foresight model.The second is the
change in labor supply generated by the change in the marginal utility of
wealth.The realization of w1 provides newinformationthat generates an
updatein the distribution of future wages and brings about a revision in
the forecast of Aj. Unfortunately,there are no closed—form expressions
for Alt in an uncertain environmentThus, the component of the change in
labor supply attributable to wealtheffects is usually treated as a
"nuisance", and iseliminated by an instrumental variables procedure.This
is not to say that the wealth effects associated with observed wage changes
aresmall.Indeed, my reading of the evidence suggests they are
potentially significant.However, the difficulty of deriving a formal or
even approximate expression for has lead most researchers to
concentrateon the intertemporal substitution effect.
81n fact, closed form expressions for under perfect foresight are
not easily obtained.One case chat can be solved uses an LES—form for the
within—period utility function U.SeeAshenfe].ter and Ham (1979).8
III. Enwirical Implications and Evidence
a. The Lifecvde Profile of Hours
The first snd most dirert implication of the lifecycle mod.l concerns
the shape of the lifecycle hours profile. As pointed out earlier, with
perfect foresight and constant real interest rates. the model implies that
the lifecycle profile of hours consists of a taste component, a trend, and
a component that is strictly proportional to wages.The presence of
uncertainty adds other components with mean zero over a large sample of
lifecycles. To see this, re—write the lifecycle labor supply function as:
(4.3) log - +log W. + 6 ( log A10 +( P I +
—EQlog + q (log W- EQ log
S r -r1+ it-j )
where EQ denotes expectations at the beginning of the lifecycle, and r is
the expected real interest rate in period 0 (assumed to be constant)
Hours at age t differ from hours planned at the beginning of the lifecycle
by a term representing the forecast error in wages, plus another
representing the cumulative forecast errors in interest rates and the
marginalutility of income. Overalarge sample of lifecycles (spanning
different periods of calendar time), the estimated age profile of lifecycle
9
hourstherefore converges to the mean of the planned profiles.
The typical shapes of the lifecycle profiles of wages and hours for
maleworkers are illustrated in Figures 1 and2.The underlying data for
9Obviously,it may not be possible to recover an unbiased estimate of
the planned lifecycle profile of hours from a sample of individuals in the
same cohort, since these individuals share the same aggregate—level shocks
in each year of their life.9
these figures are tsken from the 1977—1989 Match Current Population Surveys
(CI'S) ,andpertain to annual hours and average hourly earnings (annual
earnings divided by annual hours) for calendar years 1976-88. Figure 1
shows annual averages of log wages for 6 single—year age cohorts.Each
distinct line in the figure tracks the wage profile of a single cohort over
the13 year sample period.Figure 2 shows the corresponding profiles of
average annual hours.
The data in Figure 1 suggest char successive cohorts face similar
expected wage profiles: real wages rise quickly between the ages of 20 and
30. and then growmore slowly to apeak around age 50. Nevertheless, there
are obvious year effects in average hourly earnings.and important cohort
effects,During the 1980's,latercohorts tended to earn lower real wage
rates than earlier ones.This negative wage growth provides a" interesting
opportunityto testLewis'(1956)influential interpretation of the trend
towardlower hours of work during the first half of the 20th century.
Levis (1956, p.197) argued that the decline reflected a" income effect,
driven by higher average wages for successive cohorts of workers. If this
interpretation is correct,oneshould detecta"increase in hours for the
mastrecent cohorts.
10The samples for each year consist of men age l67Oexcludingthose
whoare classified as self employed and those with allocated wage and
salaryearnings.Individuals who report positive wage and salary earnings.
positive weeks of work, and positive usual hours per week for the previous
year are counted as working.Individuals who were working and who report
average hourly earnings less than $1.00 or greater than $75 (in 1983
dollars) are deleted from the sample. The sample sizes ineachyear range
from 36,000 to 42.000.
11Average real wage rates declined sharply between 1979 and 1981. For
the youngest cohort in Figure 1, this effect appears as a slowdown in the
rateof growth of wages. For older cohorts,real wages actually declined.10
The lifecycle profiles of hours in Figure 2 have a rather different
shape than rhe profile of wages.Per—capita hours of work reach their peak
in the early 30s. are roughly constant co age 40, fall slightly to age 50,
and then decline sharply. The pattern of hours among chose who actually
work is similar. reaching a peak of about 2100 hours at: age 30, remaining
arable to age 50, falling to 1900 hours at age 60, and then declining
sharply. The growth in hours at the beginning of the lifecycle coincides
with a gradual withdrawal from school.Thirty percent of all 20 year oHs
in the March CPS (1977-89) report their main activity in the previous veek
as "in school".This fraction falls to 11 percent by age 23 and to 2
12
percent by age 30. Much of the decline in per—capita hours at the other
end of the lifecycle reflects withdrawal from the labor force. By age 62,
only 50 percent of men are still working any hours. Lifecycle patterns in
enrollment and employment probabilities are illustrated in Figure 3,which
graphs the average probabilities by age for men in the 13 year OPS
13
sample.
Thehours profiles in Figure 2 indicate strong year effects, with all
cohorts showing a downturn in hours in 1982.In contrast to the profiles
of wages. however,thehours profiles of the younger cohorts are not
systematically different from those of the older cohorts.Thus, there is
noevidence for the inter—cohort income effects underlying Lewis'
explanation for the earlier decline in per—capita hours.
12The CPS does not ask "weeks in school" during the previous year, or
giveany breakdownofhours per week into work and school time.
13Theemployment and enrollment rates in Figure 3 arenotadjustedfor
anycohort effects.'However, adjusted races are very similar.11
Ho"well does the lifecycle model explain the lifecycle profile of
hours? Between the ages of 20 and 30 "ages grow by 40-45 percent, per
capitaannual hours grow by 55 percent, the employment rate grows by 10
points,andhours conditionalonworkinggrow by 45 percent.Betweenthe
agesof30 and50, "ages rise another 10-15percent.conditional hours are
constant. and the probability of working falls5points.Finally, between
the ages of 50 and 60, "ages fall 5 percent, conditional hours fall 5—10
percent, and the employment rate falls by over 20 points. Clearly,the
degrees of "curvature" in the lifecycles profiles of "ages and hours are
different. Of course this does not refute the lifecycle model, because
tastes may vary systematically with age. and it is also possible that the
intertecnporal substitution elasticity varies with the number of hours
14 worked.
Astronger test is provided by the data in Figures 4 and 5, which
represent "age and conditional hours profiles for men in 3 education
classes: 0—0 years of schooling, exactly 12 years of schooling, and 16 or
more years of schooling.15 Between the ages of 30 and O the "age profiles
of these three groups differ dramatically. Wages of college graduates grow
some 40 percent, "ages of highschool graduates grow about 20 percent. and
wages of individuals with minimal schooling grow only 10 percent. However,
14The "age profiles are also potentially biased estimates of the "age
profiles for the "hole population, since we only observe "ages for workers.
One way to evaluate the size of this bias is to assume that "ages for those
not working would be at some lower bound (say. the minimum "age) and then
tore—calculate the average "age.This procedure suggests that rhe bias in
the "age profiles up to age 50 is trivial.
15These profiles areestimatedage coefficients from regressions of
averagelog wages and average log hourson age effects, year effects, and a
setof broad (10-yearinterval)cohort effects.12
for all three groups. hours (conditionsl on working)are constant between
age 30 end 50.In fact, the hours profiles of the different education
groups are very similar.To explain these data withasimple lifecycle
model requires a fairly elaborate set of taste parameters. 16 A simpler
interpretation is that the shape of the wage profile bears no causal
relation to the shape of the hours profile.
It also is interesting to compare the three education classes in terms
of their average lifetime hours and average lifetime wages. For
simplicity, assume that individuals with 0—8 years of schooling begin work
at age 16,vhilehighschool graduates begin work at 18 and college
17
graduates begin work at 22. Then average hours worked per year between
the ages of 16 and 69 for the three education groups are es follows:
Years Education Hours/lear Hours/Year. if working
0 —8 1265 1756
12 1537 1809
16÷ 1638 1833
Given the wage differentials between the 3groups. these data suggest that
higher lifetime wages are associated with higher lifetime hours. This
160ne could also appeal to models with endogenous human capital
accumulation. Evidence presented by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988)
however, indicates that legged hours have no influence on future wages.
This seems to rule out simple capital accumulation models.
17These assumptions clearly understate the total labor supply of the
more—educated workers.First, many students work part—time or part of the
year.Second, actual time spent in school is arguably closer to work than
leisure.13
positive association calls into question the conventional view that long-
runlaborsupply is negatively associated with wages.
1.8
L_Econonrz-Wide Fluctuations
Muchof the initial interest in lifecycle labor supply facussed on its
potential value in explaining cyclical changes in employment and/or hours.
Sincecyclicalvariationin realwagesis limited, en equilibriummodel
with a stable aggregate labor supply function requires a relatively high
elasticityof labor supply to generate large swings inemploymentor hours.
Inprinciple, a lifecycle framework can reconcilerelatively elastic labor
supplyresponses overthe business—cycle with inelastic(or even negatively
sloped)'long run!! Labor supply,Recall that the intercemporal
substitution elasticity (i in equation (4))is necessarily larger than the
elasticity of hours holding constant either utility or wealth.Thus the
intertemporal substitution effect of a given change in wages q is
certainly positive andispotentially large
To see the implications of the lifecycle model at the aggregate level,
consider forming the average change in labor supply between periods t—l and
t for a sample of individuals.Equation (5)implies that
(5a) Alog —M+ tj Eslog w. 8 (r1 p) +
18Finegan (1962) examined data on wages and weekly hours in different
occupation and industry classes, and found a generally negative relation
between them. On the other hand, Finegan's results indicate a positive
association by level of education.However, he dismisses this evidence.
asserting that wage differentials by education class include prernia for
training costs that should be netted out. I have attempted an analysis
similar to Finegan's using data an 483 3-digit occupations for men inthe
March 1988 C?S. These data show a strong positive association between
average hours and average wages in different occupations. even controlling
for education and other demographic factors.14
where tlog ht represents the average change in log hours in the sample,. M
represents the average change in the taste variable, A1ogW represents the
average change in log wages. and represents the mean Of the forecast
errors in log Ai In principle it is possible to estimate (Sa) on
aggregate—leveldata.Something like this is actually carried out in Lucas
and Rapping (1970) .Altonji(1982). and Nankiw, Rotemberg and Summers
(1985)Here I vish to discuss the implications of (5e)for the "time
effects" that emerge in ulicroeconometric studies of labor supply. This
ideawas suggestedby Ashenfelter (1984)and is pursued by Angrist (1989.
1990)
Ashenfelter (1984)observed that aggregate changes in labor supply for
a fixed cohort take a particularly simple form if (1)thereare no
aggregate components of taste variation. (ii) the real interest rate equals
the rate of rime preference, and (iii)individuals have perfect foresight.
In this case equation (Sa) reduces to
flog h — Alog V.
Apart from sampling error. the mean change in hours is strictly
proportional to the mean change in wages. This specification can be freed
up by assuming that the taste components of individual labor supply follow
asystematic lifecycle trend.For example, suppose that
—
a1+ b + c/2Age.
where is a permanent person—specific component of tastes, Agejdenotes
the age of individual i in period t, and b and c are comon population
parameters. Then equation (5a) implies
(6)Alog h
—bc/2 +c't + ip alog w15
Since (by assumption) the only aggregate components of labor supply are
taste and wage variation, equation (6)should fit the mea" changes f hours
end wages exactly. apart from sampling error in the estimated means.
Therefore,as the numberof individuals jn the panel increases, the
associatedwith(6) should tend to unity.
19
Ebtimates of this equation are presented in Angrist (1989) using the
means of wages and hours for a panel of males in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID).20 Corresponding estimates based on cohort—level data from
consecutive CPS samples are presented in Angrlst (1990) .Inanalyzing the
CPSsamples, Angrist (1990) divides the available data into two subsamples
——1963—74and 1975-87 ——andfollows me" age 25—50 in 1964 inthefirst
subsample, and me" age 25-50in1976 in the second.Angrist's estimates qf
the Iritertemporal substitution elasticity (with their estimated standard
errors in parentheses) are as follows:
19These implications ai unchanged if one adds a person— and time-
specific component of taste variation to the model.





None -.13 -.01 .61
(04) (.01) (.09)
Linear .56 .2s .58
(.12) (.08) (.09)
Quadratic .63 -.04 .94
(.21) (.10) (.14)
Angristalso reports a specification test based on the of the fitted
models. The specifications that include either linear or quadracic taste
components yield Cest statistics below conventional significance levels in
the PSID sample. In the CPS sample, all of the test statistics are above
their ,5 percent critical values, although it must be recognized that the
samplesizes areltrge ——7,000to 10,000 per year.Interestingly, none of
theCPSresults is substantively different whenthean.alysis is repeated on
samples of men with a fixed age distribution in each year.
These results suggest that there is a systematic positive relation
between mean wages and meanhours,particularly in the more recent sample
period.The relationship isillustratedin Figure 6, which plot two
measures of average annual labor supply together withameasure of mean log
wages for men age 20-50 in 1976.Wages and hours for these men (and for
other cohorts) rose between 1976 and 1978, fell In the early 1980's. and
then recovered. The timing of the post—1980 upturn differs between wages
(which grew between 1981 and 1982) and hours (which continued to fall until
1982). The covariation of wages and hours is also weak in the last 4 years17
of the data. Nevertheless, wage and hours changes from 1976 to 1988are
very highly correlated
Should we conclude that Iritertemporal labor supply does a good job of
explaining the time effects that emerge in an microeconometricz model? My -
beliefis that such a conclusion is premature. The reason is that the
assumption of perfect foresight regarding the aggregate changes that
occurred in the late 1970's and early 1980's is surely false.In the 3
decades before 1976, average real wages in the U.S. economy grew fairly
21
steadilyat 2—3 percent per year.After 1975. real wage growth
essentiallystopped.This sharp downward adjustment in trend, coupled with
the actuallossesin realwagesin the early 1980s,suggeststhat natty
individuals suffered unexpected reductions in their lifetime wealth
According to the Lifecycle model, these changes should have affected hours
decisions,and therefore should be modelled in the aggregate labor supply
equation.
The difficulty is that very little is known about the evolution of the
marginal utility of income or the size of the wealth elasticity 6. One
approach is to write down a" intuitively plausible or econometrically
convenient model for Aj. For example. Lucas and Rapping (1970)specified
a labor supply function of the form
* *
(7) Logbj
— + q(logw -logwj)+ 8 log
where
1ogw— I b Elogw4 (Eb1)
21Between 1947 and 1976, for example, realaveragehourly earnings of
"on—supervisory workers roseata" average annual rate of 2.38 percent.18
Thisis equivalent to replacing 6 log with -+0)log Wftinthe
laborsupply function (4)22AsAltonjiandAshenfelter (1980) pointed
out,the labor supply effects of aggregate wage changesirthismodel
depend critically on the degree of persistence ininnovationsto the real
wage. F'fact,itis difficult to reject the hypothesis that the aggregate
realwage rateis a random walk with drift.If workers assume that the
"yeareffects" in individual wages have the same property. then the labor
supplyeffect of a change in the aggregate component of wages depends only
on the "long run" elasticity 8.23Ifthis is negative (as Lewis(1956) and
manysubsequent authors have assumed) and if individuals expect aggregate-
levelchangesinreal wages to persiscindefinitely(as is perhaps truefor
changes in economy—wide real wage rates) then the predicted correlation
between the year effects in hours and wages from a panel of individual data
is negative I
The only evidence in the microeconometric literature pertaining to the-
signof the "long run" labor supply elasticity (i.e., theelasticity of
hours with respect to a parallel shift in wage profiles) is from MaCurdy
(1981,1985). Macurdy (1985)suggests a less restrictive specification
for the marginal utilityofincomethanLucas—Rapping:
220ne can derive a" intertemporal labor supply function that is
approximately equivalent tothe Lucas-Rapping function(with 6—0)usingthe
within—periodpreferencefunction
U(c,h) —ca
However, thisisonly valid in theabsenceof uncertainty.
23To see this, decompose log wintoa permanent person effect. a
year effect v,anda person and yr specific effect. and suppose
Then (7) implies log —a
+øv.19
flogA1 — + E log
This specification implies that the elasticity of mean hours with respect
to a permanent change in "ages is q + where is the mean of the
coefficientsover the remaining lifecycle and
7Ajt ,c1 —1-
flog Ait
varieswith the share of current assets in lifetime wealth. MaCurdy(1985)
presentsestimates for 7 centering on -.0?for individuals at the start of
their lifecycle.This is an upper bound on the absolute magnitude of the
wealth effect of a permanent innovation in wages for older workers, since
these individuals have a larger share of lifetime wealth in assets.
MaCurdyts estimates, then, suggest that the wealth effect of a permanent
change in wages issmall. andthat a permanent 10 percent increase in wages
is associated with a roughly 1 percent increase in hours. 24
In my opinion, much more work needs to be done on measuring the wealth
effects of expected future wages before wecan conclude that the lifecycle
model providesan adequate description of the year—to—year changes in
averagelabor supply observed in a panel.One useful exercise that has not
yet been carried out istocombine information on mean levels of
consumption and hours for a panel such as the PSID. The assumption of
perfect foresight implies that changes in meanconsumption are described by
anequation of the form
sestimatesof the tntertemporal substitution elasticity
center on .15 ——seebelow.20
flogc
— +e Alog w,
where represents the mea" across individuals of a taste shifter in
consuaption,and e (which is approximately equal toq-6)measures the
degreeofcomplernentarily or substitutability between leisure and
consumption, holding constant the marginal utility of wealth. At a
minimum,the goodness—of—fit of this equation provides a" indication of the
magnitude of aggregate changes in the marginal utility of wealth.
.JndtviduaL-$pectfic Comp_ertts of Wa2e and Hours Variation
Inaddition Co its implications for the age and time effects in
microeconometricstudies of labor supply, the lifecycle model offers a
potentialexplanation for individualand period—specific hours variation
Specifically. suppose that Lndividual log wages are determined by a"
equation of the form:
(8)
where
W1isa person—specificconstant, isan aggregate effect, and
is a person and time—specific effect. Then equation(5)implies
(9)Alog h1 Mog ht— Aa)+ + •
Theperson—specific component of hours variatLon in period t consists of
person-specific taste variation, aperson—specificintertemporal
substitution effect and the difference between the person—specific
forecast error in log end the average forecast error over the entire
sample.
The person—specific component of year—to—year changes in labor supply
is large.For example, Altonji. and Paxson (1985) estimate that the cross-
sectional standard deviation of the change in log annual hours between21
consecutive years is 0.35 for me" age 18to60 in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics(PSID).Using data constructed from survey information gathered
every 4monthsin the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),I
estimatethat the standard deviation of the change in log annual hours for
men age 22—59 who worked in 1984 end 1985 is 0.54 (Card(1990)).some of
this variation is clearly attributable tomeasurementerror.Evidence
reported by Duncan and Hill(1985) suggests that the signal—to—noise ratio
in the measured change in lag annual hours in the PSID is 1.22. 25 Applying
this correction factor. the estimated standard deviation of true hours
changes for continuously employed me" in the PSID is 0.26, and eve" larger
26
for me in the SIPP panel.
Nevertheless, virtually "one of this variation is explained by the
person—specificintertemporalsubstitutioneffect. Alconj i(1986, Tables
1,2) reportsmeasuresof K2 forlabor supply equations like (9) that
instrument theindividual—specific component of wage variation and treat
theother two components (person—specific changes in taste and person-
specific updating in the marginal utility ofincome)as residuals. The
proportions of explained variance are essentially 0.
25This estimate isbasedon a sample of individuals working for a
singleemployer over twoyears. and is surely an upper bound on the
signal/noiseratio.
261 suspect that a retrospective survey on annual hours in the
previous year probablyunderstates the true variation in average hours per
week.since manyindividuals with substantial within—year variation it
hoursper week are likely to report a simple "umber like "40 hours per
week". This is especially problematic In the CPS survey, because
interviewers are instructed to gather modal (rather than average) hours per
week from such individuals.However. I have bee" unable to ascertain if
the more frequent interview schedule in the SIPP accounts for the higher
variation in annual hours changes.22
Onereasonfor this lowproportion of explained variance is the very
smallmagnitude of the estimated intertemporal substitution elastLcittes
that typically emerge from microeconometric studies. 27MaCurdy's (1981)
estimatesfrom the PSID range from 0.10 to 0.45. Altonjl's (1986)
estimates, also based on PSID data, range from 0 to 0.5, with the more
precise estimates clustered near the bottom of this interval. A similar
rangeof estimates emerges from other studies of the PSi!)includingHam
(1986),andfrom the detailed study of cohort—level data from the British
FamilyExpenditureSurvey by Browning. Deaton, and Irish (1985). Taken
together, the literature suggests that the elasticityof Intertemporal
substitutionis surely no higher than 0.5, and probably no higher than
0.20.Given such small elasticities, the component of individual hours
changes attributable to intertemporal substitution effects is tiny.
This leads to the question of whether there is explanation for
individual—specific hours variation.One source of systematic hours
variation that is described by the labor supply model, but ignored in most
studies, is idiosyncratic variation in the marginal utility of wealth.
Some of this is potentially explainable by observed wage changes,
particularly if person-specific wage innovations are highly persistent. To
collect some evidence on the persistence of idiosyncratic wage shocks. I
fit a very simple version of the components—of—variance model(8) Co data
on log wages for men in the PSID. Specifically. the model assumes that the
measured log wage of individual J.in period C is given by:
270ne exception is Nacurdy's (1983) study using asampleof males in
thecontrol group of the DenverIncome Maintenance Experiment. MaCurdy
does not parameterlze preferences in such a way as to imply a constant
intertemporal substitution elasticity. However,his estimates imply that
theinterteinporal elasticity 1.shigh:inthe neighborhood of 2.0.23
(10) log wft —W1+ V + +
where it —iti+
ft
var(c1) — cov(çI, —0,t 0
var(w1) — var(p1)
—cr2,
cov(c1Wj)— cov(c1Pft) —cov(w1,Mj) —0.
In this model the person-• and period—specific wage shock consists of two
components:a first—order serially correlated component with atime—varying
variance anda serially uncorrelated component One
interpretationof the latter is as awhitenoise survey measurement error.
However1this is indistinguishablefroma "purely transitory" wage
component.I have fit this model (using minimum distance techniques) to
the covariance matrix of individual wagedata for 1374 men who worked in
each year between 1969 and 1979.28 For convenience in estimation I have
used the wage data for 1971—78 only.
The covariances of the wage data are presented in Table 1together
with their estimated standard errors and the average autocovariances at
each lag. The autocorrelations decline from 0.78 (et lag 1) Co 0.59 (at
lag 7). There is someevidenceof nonstationarity in the data, with the
variancesandcovariances rising in the last years of the panel. The
sampleexcludes 105 individuals whootherwisemeet the data requirements
butwho are eliminatedbyvirtue of reportinganhourlywage lessthan
$0.75 or greater than $100 (in 1967$)inone or more years.Whenthese
28specifically.I estimated the vector of parameters by minimizing
(ii• • f(fi))where m is the vector of 36 second moments of the
wage data, f(fi) isthe vector of fitted moments, and Visthe estimated
variancematrix of the second moments.24
individualsare included, the variances and covariances are 25 percent
largerbut the autocorrelations are very similar.
Thisvery simple model fits the wage data surprisingly well. The
overall goodness—of—fit statistic is 35.31, which has a probability value
of 8 percent.The parameter estimates and their implications are
29
sumarized in Table 2. One half of the cross—sectional variance in wages
is attributed to permanent person—effects. Another 15 percent is
attributable to the pure white noise component.This variance share is
actually much lower than the share of measurement error reported in the
PSID validation study (Bound et.al. (1989), Table 2),suggestingthat all of
can easily be attributed co measurement error. Theremainingcomponent
of variance is highly persistent: the estimated AR(1) coefficient a is
0.89.
To see the implications of this persistence. consider the effect of a
unix innovation in the person—specific wage component on the simple




In the first case. suppose that is all measurement error. so that a
unitinnovation inwagesispurely aninnovationin Uft.Then, assuming
fl—.9 (i.e., a discount race of 11.1 percent), the effect on the discounted
average of expected future wages is (1 -afi)—0.494.On the ocher
hand, suppose that there is no measurement error in wages. The" a unit
innovation in the wage shock implies a 0.69 innovation in and a 0.31
29There area total
o1212parametersin the model, including the 8
period—specificvariances end the variance of the pre-sample shock U10.25
30
I n n o vat I o n I n - Inthis case. the discounted svecsge of expected
future log wages rises by 0.34.
The results of this exercise suggest that a typical person—specific
wage innovation results in a significant revision to lifetime wealth. Of
course, it is possible that individuals have better information with which
to forecast future wages than is available to an outside data analyst. In
thiscase. wage innovations in thestatistical model (La) do not
necessarilyrepresentnewinformation.Clearly, we need much further
evidence before wecanuse the lifecycle model to model the wealth effects
of person—specific wage shocks.
One possible approach is to combine consumption and hours information
to obtain direct estimates of and then to consider projections of the
forecast errors in log A,on wages and other information.31To see how
this might work. write the log—linear version of the Intertemporal
consumption function implied by the first—order conditions (3a) and (3b)
as:
log Cfte log• f log
(For simplicity I will ignore any coportents of taste variation, although
these can be handled) -Thisconsumption function can be combined with the
labor supply function(4) to give:
(11) log hj —• &e/f)log +6/flog cit.
30Thisusesthe linear projection E(ala+b)—(a÷b).var(a)/var(a+b).
31This approach follows up on MaCurdy' (1983)method for estimating
theparameters of the lifecycle model.t{aCurdy's procedure is used by
Blurtdell (1990).26
This equation is the within—period optimality condition implied by setting
the marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure equal to the
wage.
32
An instrumental variables procedure can be applied to (11) to
estimate the coefficients (q be/f) and6/f.Similarly,theintertemporal
labor supply elasticity can be estimated by conventional means, for
example by applying instrumental variables to (8). Then, using the
(approximate.) restriction thate—1 £,it ispossible torecover
estimates of the coefficients e and f.(Alternatively, onecan estimate
thecoefficient e in the intertemporal consumption function directly see
Altonji (1986) for example).Finally, these can be used to form an
estimate of log Aft from the observed consumption and wage data for each
person.
Givenestimates of log Aj it should be possible to estimate the
relationbetween the marginal utility of income end observable information.
such as current assets and current and lagged wages.One could then test a
specific modal for log such as the one implied by the Lucas—Rapping
labor supply function, or the one implied by perfect foresight.It would
alsobe useful to estimate components—of—variance models for the change in
themarginal utility of income. A recent paper by Altug and Miller (1990)
shows that the assumption of complete contingent markets imposes a simple
factor structure on A1: .\ —i A,If this is correct, the
idiosyncratic component of the estimated change in log should be
orthogonalto individual—specific information,controlling for a
32Noticethat if one maintains the assumption e—0 (i.e.thatwages
have no effect on consumption, holding cons tanC A), then one can obtain
estimates of the intertem.cn]. substitutionelasticityfromcross—sectional
dataIThis procedure is used by Altonji (1986). and seems to give
estimates of i7 about the same size as those obtained by estimating (8)27
homogeneous time effect. Altug and Miller's results suggest that this set
of restrictions may be acceptable.
A major limitation to this line of research is the absence of panel
datasets with information o"consumptionexpenditures.The leading panel
data source, the PS ID, only contains information on food expenditures.
Someprogress may be possible using the cohort level data in the British
FamilyExpenditure Survey,although the labor supply information contained
in this survey is limited to weekly hours.
d. Other Sources of Variation in Individual Labor_Ssj
Although careful Uodellingofwealtheffectsmay gosome way toward
improving our understanding of the determinants of individual labor supply,
I am not optimistic that a conventional lifecycle model can ever explain
morethan atiny fraction of the year—to—year variation in the data. One
maybe tempted to attribute the unexplained changes totastesor
measurement error. There is a graving body of evidence, however, which
suggests that idiosyncratic changes in labor supply are systematically
related to conditions on the demand side of the labor market.There are
two complementary explanations for this link.On one hand, individuals may
be unable to sell all their offered labor supply. On the other, some form
of fixed costs may enter into either the supply or demand sides of the
labor market.
Ashenfelrer and Ham(1979)and Ham (1986) present models of
thtertemporallabor supply which assume that reported unemployment contains
33For example, Altonji's (1986)use of observed food consumption asa
control for the marginal utility ofincome results ittonlya small increase
inthe explanatory power of his fitted labor supply equations28
information on hours constraints faced by workers. Specifically, these
authors assume that desired hours of work are described by an equation such
as(4).In the presence of labor market disequilibrium, actualhours sold
naybe lower.FollowingAshenfelter(1978) suppose that a fraction Bof
reported weeks of unemployment represent weeks in which an individual was
unable to sell his or her labor.This leads to aspecificationof the
lifecycle labor supply function that includes measured unemployment (or its
first difference) on the right—hand—side, with a coefficient of 8.
Estimates of this coefficient reported in Ashenfelter and Ham(1979) and
"am(1986) are positive andsignificant. Furthermore,the inclusion of
measuredunemploymentleadsto a significant increase in the explanatory
power of the labor supply equation.
The interpretation of such an augmented labor supply function is an
issue of considerable dispute.Heckman and MaCurdy (1989) .followingLucas
and Rapping (1970), argue that measured unemployment is simply another
componentof leisure.Because of the hoursconstraint, the sum of leisure
and unemployment is .necessarjlynegativelycorrelated with hours of work.
Accordingto Heclcmanand MaCurdythen. individuals withlonger hours of
unemploymentaresimply those who are consuming more leisure.
Evidence presented by Ham (1986) sheds some interesting light on the
interpretation of reported unemployment, and also on the underlying
question ofwhetcauses individual hours of worktovary from year to year.
To see the nature of this evidence, consider the following (simplified)
tntarternporallabor supply function:
(12) Aloghj
—qAlog + I +629
where Di is a vector of demand conditions in an individual's local labor
market,industry, and/or occupation.There is no mechanical connection
betweenthe measurement of hit and the measurementof D. Ifthe labor
supply model is correctly specified, hovever the"P—O,since market—level
information should be irrelevant toindividualhours decisions, controlling
forindividual—specificwages.Although he does not report direct
estimatesof 1 in his1986 paper, Ham's results using ADj as instrumental
variablesforindividualunemployment indicate that 1 isfardifferent from
zero. A"earlier unpublished version of the paper (Ham (1984)) presents
direct tests for the exclusion of industry, occupation, and local
unemployment rates from a"individual labor supply equatipn. The tesr
statisticsare highly significant, indicating a" explicit role far demand-
side variables in the determination of individual labor supply. WhenHam
usesthe demand—side variables to instrument reported unemployment in the
labor supply equation, he continues to findevidence of a negative and
significant effect of unemployment on hours of work. This is evidence
against a strict labor supply model, and in favor of a model in which
reported unemployment conveys information about the demand conditions
facing a" individual worker.
Oneneed not appeal to Keynesian—stylelabor market constraints to
rationalizeHam's findings,however.An alternative explanation is that.
labor supply decisions are made at a higher frequency rime unit than the
year (for example the week), andthat there are significant fixed costs on
eitherthe worker'sside orthe employer's sideof the labor market. A
modelalong the latter lines is presented in Rosen(1986) and Card30
(199O34Inthis model, effective labor input from a pool of N workers is
t4g(h). where gisan S—shaped function of hours worked per person. The
optimalemploymentpolicy of a firmwith thistechnology consists of a two-
part rule: ifproduct demand issufficiently low,layoffa fractionof the
laborforce and employ the remainder at some minimum threshold level of
hours.If product demand is sufficiently high, employ all available
workersat hours above the threshold.
The implications of this firm—level behavior for individual labor
supply data are two—fold.First. some component of annual hours variation
will occur at a fixed hourly wage rate.In particular.individuals working
atfirms withrelatively low product demand will,varytheir number of weeks
worked. but in each week of employment they will supply the same number of
hours, and (presumably) earn the same weekly wage.For these individuals.
hours of work will vary directly with measures of the firm's product
demand. Second, weekly hours will be observed tofluctuateabove a
(parson—specific) minimumthreshold.Evidence presented in Card (1990)
indicatesthat the latter prediction is surprisingly close to the truth.
In a sample of 2800 men observed working for the same employer over atwo
year period, reported hours per week in each of 8 interviews were observed
to fall below 35hourspar week in only 11 percent of cases.
Asimple fixed cost model of this kind suggests that employer demand
conditions should affect weeks of employment per year. Predictions on the
connectionbetween employer demand and hoursper week depend on theassumed
class of models with similar properties are analyzed in a macro
context by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). In these papers, labor supply
within tha week is assumed to be either0 or1.
35See Card(1990, Table3).31
formofemployment contract. K paper (Card (1990)) presents acase in
which. conditional on working, hours per week lie on a conventional supply
schedule. I" this case, controlling for the wage, employer demand should
have no effect on hours per week.Some simple evidence on this prediction
is presented in Table 3, whichshowsthe results of estimating the
augmentedlabor supply function (12) a" three measures of labor supply:
hours per week, weeks per quarter. and total quarterly hours.
Thedata sunnarized in Table 3 pertainto me" in the 1984 SIP?paneL.
Thesample is restricted to individuals whoare observedworking for at
most one employer over the 9quartersof the available sample period.
Demand—side conditions are measured by the logarithm of employment in the
individual'sone-digit industry.Thus,LDft refers tothe percentage
changein employmentin an individual's industry in the most recent
quarter. The equations areestimatedby instrumental variables, using as
an instrumentfor wages the change in wages observed for the same person 4
quartets inthe past or 4quarters in the future.There isasmall but
highly significant seasonal correlation in individual wagechangesthat
gives this instrumental variable its power.
Theestimatessuggest that uieasures ofemployment demand are
significantlycorrelated with both hours per week andweeksper quarter.
I" comparison, the estimated iritertemporalsubstitutionelasticities are
smalland relatively imprecise.
36
One could easily conclude from this
evidence that changes in labor supply are directly connected toew.ployet
36oestimatesofthe equation result in negative and significant
wage coefficients. presumably asaconsequence of measurementerrorin
averagehourly earnings. Further results are reported in Card (1990)32
demand conditions, and that wages play little or no role in the short—run
labor—leisure decision.
Therelatively weak connection between hours per week and wages
illustrated in columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 may seem puzzling, give" that the
Fair Labor Standards Act mandates overtime payments for individuals in many
occupations who work over 40 hours per week.Some additional evidence o"
the relation between weekly hours and wages is provided by data in the May
1985 CPS.This survey gathered information on usual hours per week, actual
hours worked in the previous week,andwhether or notthe individual
receivedanyovertimepayments.The responsessuggest that there is
substantial variation in actual weekly hours around "usual" weekly hours:
13percent of me" indicate that they workedlass than theirusual hours.
while another 19 percent indicate that they worked more. Individuals itt
the letter group report 10 extra hours per week on average, bringing their
weekly total to 51 hours. However, only 47 percenc of these men report
receiving any additional overtimecompensation. For the majority, weekly
hours are higherthen usuaL but weekly earnings arefixed.
38
Table4 provides moredetailedinformation on a very narrov subsetof
individuals those who usually work 35-40hoursper week and who report
41ormorehoursin the survey week. Sixty-twopercentof all workers
normally work35—40 hours per week. Of these, 13.5 percent worked 41or
37Thesestatistics pertain to me" sge 16—64 whoholdonly one joband
whoatenotself—employed. Variation in weekly. hosrs among theexcluded
groupis even larsen
38Unfortunately,the survey does not ask about reduced compensation
for individuals who worked less than usual hours.
s" effort to obtain areasonablylarge sample, this table
includes both ma" and women.33
more hours in the survey week, and are sumarized in the Table. The
fraction receiving overtime compensation among this group is 59 percent.
Interestingly, however, extra hours worked are actually slightly higher for
the group with noovertimepay.
These data suggest that even within the week, * simple labor supply
model is inadequate for a large fraction of the population. Kany
individuals appear to beworktngextrahours for no extra pay. "he" this
behavior is added to the phenomenon of weeklylayoffs,it becomes clear how
asimple model of labor supply caneasilyfail to explain movements in
annualhours.
Further woticisobviously needed toisolatethe systematic components
ofindividuallabor supply, and to describe the links between employer
demand and employee hours choices.While such work falls outside the
"arrow realm of a conventional lifecyclemodel.it seems to me that further
understanding of individual hours outcomes willrequirea broader
perspective than the standard model canprovide.As it stands. the
lifecycle model provides essentially no insight into the year—to—year
variation in individual hours.
IV.ConcIusions
I"principle, the lifecycle labor supply model offers a" explanation for
the four main aspects of individual hours choices: mea" hours over the
lifecycle; the age profile of hours; aggregate movements in hours; and
individual—specific variation in hours around the lifecycle profile.All
of these components are tied together by a combination of interteliq3otal
substitutioneffects and wealtheffect.itt this paper I have tried to34
gauge the success of lifecycle model in explaining the various dimensions
of male labor supply.My assessment is hardly positive: the only real
success for the model has come as a description of aggregate patterns in
wages and hours during the post—1970 period.Even here, my suspicion is
that a careful consideration of wealth effects will undermine the success
of the model.
Much of the inicroeconometric research over the past two decades has
concentratedon the magnitude of the intertemporal substitution effect, and
in particular on Uodellingthe intertemporal substitution effect of
individual—specificwagevariation.As Pencavel noted in his 1986 survey,
the available evidence suggests that this effect is of second—order
importance. My view is that a similar conclusion holds with respect to the
intertempora]. substitution effect in the age profile of hours. With
respect to the permanent component of hours, there ismuch ambiguity in the
literature. Afairly wide—spread belief among labor economists is that a
permanent increase in wages leads toareduction in hours. Using modern
panel datait is surprisingly hard to verify this hypothesis, andin fact
the preponderance ofthe evidence suggests to me a positive association
betweenlong—run wages and average hours.
Twomajoravenues for further work are suggested.one involves a
detailed effort to estimate the wealth effects in intertemporal labor
supply.Existing methods can be used to estimate the marginal utility of
wealth, and test its properties.Progress in this direction will depend on
the quality ofavailable data linking individual consumption and hours
choices.A second involves a re—evaluation ofthe premise that average
hourlyearnings are a "sufficient statistic" for current labor market35
opportunities.A variety of models suggests that individual hours are
influenceddirectly byemployer—specific demand conditions. Limited
empiricalevidence confirms this suspicion.If true, our basic notions of
laborsupply, and in particular ournotionsabout the degree of
substitutability between current and future leisure. may be incomplete.36
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Autocovarjanc. Structure of Individual 459.5
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(estimated st.ndard errors in parentheses)
Autoroverjance Of Warein






1973 0.185 0.199 0.251.
(0.010)(0.011) (0.012)
1974 0.180 0.185 0.194 0.240
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
1975 0.173 0.18? 0.18? 0,193 0.253
(0.010)(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
1976 0.168 0.178 0.180 0.188 0.205 0.271
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
1977 0.163 0.177 0.180 0.183 0.185 0.205 0.25.
(0.010) (0.010)(0.010)(0.010)(0.010) (0.018) (0.011)
1978 0.151 0.166 0.154 0.170 0.180 0.196 0.Z05 0.293
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0,016)
Avera. Autrcovatisnce at Las:
7 8 5 4 3 2 1 0
0.151 0.165 0.169 0.1750.182 0.180 0.200 0,257
(0.010) (0,009) (0.009)(0.009) (0.009)(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Not.: Sample consist, of 1374malehousehold beads from houaaholda with no
chan;e in head between 1969 and 1979, whoearnedpositive labor eernins
and worked posItive hour. in each year between 1969and1979, and whose
hourly wase wa. between 60.75 and $100 (in constant 1967 dollar.) in
all years,Table 2
Sumary ofEatimated Componenta—of—variance Wage Model
4. Parameter Estjman
(estimated standard errors in parentheses)
Paraiteter Estimate
1. Variance of Permanent Effect (,2) 0.124
(0.040)
2. Varianceof Measurement Error/
2
0.039
Purely Transitory Component (a) (0.003)
3. AR(1) Coefficient(a) 0.886
(0.077)
4. Average varianceof Wage2
0.027
Innovations(Averageof
5. Goodness of Fit (24 degrees freedom) 35.314
Note: Model is fit by optimal minimum distance to the 36
wage covariances displayed in Table 1.The model is
log w — ++ pft,
—a +
with var(c±) —(t—1,2,...8) and var(u0) —
B.Implications ofEstimates
1. Average Variance of Wages 0.249
2. Share Attributable toPermanent 0.500
Effect
3. Share Attributable toMeasurement 0.157
Error/Purely TransitoryEffect
4. Effect of Unit Wage Shock on
AverneJxoectedFuture WaEO:
(I)Assuming is measurement 0.494
error
(ii)Assuming no measurement 0.340
error
Note:'Change in discounted average of expected future log
wages,assuming a" infinite life and a .11discountrate
seetext.Table 3
Estimated Labor Supply Functiona for
Quarterly Hours Outcomes: SIPP Sample of Hen
(standarderrors in parentheses)
Depen4ritVariable (humFirst—Differences)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Hours/WicWks Total Hrs Houts/tJk W Total lirs
1.Log wage 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.14
(0.14)(0.13)(0.22) (0.14)(0.13)(0.22)
2.Industry •- -- -- 0.21 0.24 0.46
Employment (0.06)(0.06)(0.10)
3.R—squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Sample consists of 19566 observations on quarterly changes in
labor supply of 4814 men age 16-64 with same employer over 9
quarters (1983—W to 1985—I) in 1983 SIPP panel. All equations
are estimated in first—difference form, and include 9 unrestricted
quarterly dumies as well as potential experience. Log wage is
instrumented by the change in log wages of the same person 4
quarters in the past (or 4 quarters in the future. for observations
from the first 3 quarters of the sample) .Thestandard deviations
of the dependent variables are: log hours per week ——0.142;log
weeks per quarter ——0.147;log quarterly hours ——0.234.Table 4
Wages, Hours, and Overtime Premiums for





1.Number of Individuals 1651 2416














7.Percent Paid by Hour 38.10 05.67




Note: Sample consists of 4067 individuals age 16—64 in Hay 1985 OPS
who reported usual weekly hours between 35 and 40 and who
reported working 41 or more hours in the survey week. Dual—job
holders and self—employed workers are excluded. In the
May 1985 CPS 62.4 percent of all individuals report usual weekly
hours between 35 and 40 (62.3 percent of me", 62.5 percent of
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